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NUCLEAR AREA and ‘DUAL-
USE DILEMMA’ (1)  
Nuclear science and technologies have a 
‘double use’: 
medical, industrial, food,  
energy, and agriculture 
applications 
Weapons of Mass  
Destruction (WMD) 
NUCLEAR AREA and ‘DUAL-USE 
DILEMMA’ (2) 
Two meanings: 
a) the same piece of research could benefit or harm the 
humanity (misuse); or 







The dilemma refers to: 
- Scientific research (e.g.: atomic fusion or atomic 
fission); 
- Technological application of research (e.g.: dynamite).     
 
  
Richard Feynman (1918–1988), 
Theoretical physicist: 
  
 “Once in Hawaii I was taken to see a 
Buddhist temple. In the temple a man 
said: «I am going to tell you something 
that you will never forget». And then he 
said: «To every man is given the key to 
the gates of heaven. The same key opens 
the gate of hell». And so it is with 
science. In a way it is a key to the gates 
of heaven, and the same key opens the 
gate of hell, and we do not have any 
instructions as to which is which gate” 
NUCLEAR AREA and ‘DUAL-USE 
DILEMMA’ (3) 
In front of the broad possibilities of the 
“could” area, what is the “should” issue? 
 
 
The dual-use dilemma should be explored 
from the ethical and legal viewpoint. 
NUCLEAR AREA and ‘DUAL-USE 
DILEMMA’ (4) 
THE GOVERNANCE OF  
NUCLEAR AREA (1) 
a) Precautionary Principle (Kant:  
deontology)  ‘better safe than 
sorry’ 
• potential damage; 
• uncertain threat: lack of knowledge, 
of full certainty about the occurring 
of the damage and/or about the 
causal relationship between the 
action/inaction and the damage; 
• some kind of anticipatory 
regulation to adopt, i.e. before 
strong scientific proof of harm is 
developed. 
Different versions of Precautionary Principle: 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
         
 It means that nuclear technologies should not be 
































b) Proactionary Principle (Dewey: 
pragmatic ethics) 
• science and technology considered safe, 
economically desirable and intrinsically 
good unless and until it is shown to be 
otherwise; 
• the burden of proof upon those who 
want to slow down research; 
• restrictive and proportioned measures 
adopted only if the impact of an 
activity has both significant probability 
and severity, and it is really imminent 
to occur. 
 It means to leave nuclear technologies develop without any  
control, or only if and when an urgent harm is going to happen. 
THE GOVERNANCE OF  
NUCLEAR AREA (2) 
c) Cost-benefit or risk-benefit approach (Mill, 
Bentham: utilitarian view) 
•  calculation of the relevant possible benefits 
and possible monetary costs of particular 
outcomes of an action or inaction; 
• comparison of results; 
• risk: cost of harm multiplied for the 
probability that the harm will occur; 
• chosen policy: benefits > costs and risks; 
• utilitarian reasoning: maximization of 
benefits and minimization of harms. 
It means that, when economic benefits overturn the disadvantages, 
   nuclear technologies should be developed.  
THE GOVERNANCE OF  
NUCLEAR AREA (3) 
Constant analysis of both 
benefits and risks of nuclear 
area, through transparent 
and democratic cooperation 
among stakeholders 
(engagement) 
Adoption of policies to 
be periodically revised 
+ proportionality  in 
the balance of rights, 





THE GOVERNANCE OF  
NUCLEAR AREA (4) 
Proposal: ‘Responsible Stewardship’ 
Actors and Sources of the law: 
        
Actors  Instruments for achieving the policy 
Government (top down) Hard law 
Scientific community (bottom up) Soft law 
Hybrid or mixed model Mixture of sources, engagement 
approach 
 PREFERENCE: both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom 
up’ sources through the involvement, in 
concentric circles, of:  
(a) individual scientists;  
(b) educational and research institutions;  
(c) scientific communities and/or organisations;  
(d) national governments; and  
(e) international bodies. 
THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH AND SECURITY NEEDS (1)  
    The relationship between the freedom of research 
and the security needs is at the core of the ‘dual-use 
dilemma’. 
 
FREEDOM OF RESEARCH: 
 From the constitutional viewpoint, the freedom of 
scientific research is shaped as: 
(a)  part of the content of the freedom of thought and 
expression,  
(b)  a fundamental freedom having an autonomous 
content, and  
(c)  a freedom which is connected to a duty for the State 




- autonomous: individual and collective, or 
- complementary to other rights (physical 




THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
AND SECURITY NEEDS (2)  
THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE FREEDOM OF RESEARCH 
AND SECURITY NEEDS: 
 
Through the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, 
which is composed of: 
- principle of suitability: opting for a rational relationship 
between the means chosen and the ends pursued; 
- principle of necessity: choosing the least interfering means for 
promoting one goal; 
- principle of proportionality in the narrow sense: preserving the 
“essential core” of each right and freedom, despite limiting it. 
THE FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
AND SECURITY NEEDS (3)  
     The freedom of scientific research is like a person 






-  ‘Nucleus’: absolute        the right to choose the 
topic of investigation and to exercise theroretical 
speculations; 
- Further from the core nucleus: limits    in the 
phases of application, spread and diffusion of 
research.  
 Moreover, the freedom of scientific research is 






a) if research affects other fundamental rights 
and freedoms, the research should be limited;  
b) if it increases and promotes the achievement 
of other rights and freedoms, the research 
ought to be encouraged. 
 
Therefore: 
- if nuclear technologies pose at risk humanity such 
as in the case of proliferation   the freedom of 
scientific research should be limited in name of 
security, but without infringing the “nucleus” of 
the freedom itself. 
- If nuclear technologies encourage the progress for 
energy, medicine agriculture applications  the 
freedom of scientific research  this freedom should 
be boosted and broadened.  
CONCRETELY: HOW TO MANAGE 
THE ‘DUAL-USE DILEMMA’? 
1. Focus on PEOPLE: the level of scientific practice  
rules for scientists (in the phase of acquirement, 
access, use of materials through periodic screening, 
plus education and training); 
2. Focus on MATERIALS/TECHNOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS  rules about the traceability, 
possession, trade, transfer and storage of nuclear 
materials and technologies; 
3.   Focus on INFORMATION  the level of 
information   dissemination: censorship or 
publication? (see Leo Szilard’s and Enrico Fermi’s 
positions)  debate between scientists, journal 
publishers and governments  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In front of the ‘dual-use dilemma’ for 
nuclear science and technology  our 
ethical and legal proposal consists of an 
approach based on stewardship and 
responsibility through: 
- engagement of stakeholders; 
- ‘hard and soft law’ sources; 
- a proper balance of rights and freedoms 
...in order to pursue the progress in nuclear 
field, without neglecting our duties 
towards the humanity, future generations, 
and environment! 
 
 Thanks for your attention 
